Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights of Attorneys by Harpaz, Leora
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications
1998
Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free
Speech Rights of Attorneys
Leora Harpaz
Western New England University School of Law, lharpaz@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 49 (1998)
COMPELLED LAWYER REPRESENTATION 
AND THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
OF ATTORNEYS 
LEORA HARPAZ* 
INTRODucnON 
When a Hearing Commissioner for the Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") ruled this year that a 
woman lawyer could not refuse to represent men in divorce actions 
under the state's public accommodation statute, the decision set off 
a firestorm of reaction.1 In his decision in Stropnicky v. Nathan-
son,2 the Commissioner refused to rule on the lawyer's First 
Amendment defense, reasoning that such a constitutional challenge 
was beyond the scope of his authority.3 It is just that First Amend-
ment question that I will consider. 
Stropnicky arose when an attorney, Judith Nathanson, refused 
to represent Joseph Stropnicky. Mr. Stropnicky sought out her 
services in a divorce action in order to review a separation agree-
ment that had been drafted by a lawyer/mediator. In refusing to 
represent him, Ms. Nathanson informed Mr. Stropnicky that she 
only represented women in divorce cases. Mr. Stropnicky thereaf-
ter filed a complaint with the MCAD. On February 25, 1997, a 
Hearing Commissioner found Ms. Nathanson's behavior to be vio-
lative of a state statute that outlawed discrimination in places of 
public accommodation.4 The Commissioner ordered her to pay 
$5000 in damages to Mr. Stropnicky and to cease refusing to repre-
sent clients on account of their gender. 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., 1970, 
State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D., 1973, Boston University; LL.M., 
1975, New York University. I am grateful to Anne Goldstein for her helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this article. 
1. See Peter S. Canellos, Wanted: Advocate or a Free Agent? The Question Goes 
to the Heart of Whether Lawyers Should Work for Just Anyone, or Follow Their Own 
'Moral Compass,' BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 1997, at C1. 
2. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). 
3. See id. at 42. 
4. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1996). 
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In hearing about the Stropnicky case, my initial reaction was 
that the case was strikingly similar to the case of Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Groupo! Boston.s In Hurley, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Massachusetts pub-
lic accommodation law could not be applied to force the South Bos-
ton Allied War Veterans Council ("the Council") to include the 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 
("GLIB") in its St. Patrick's DaylEvacuation Day Parade. In 
reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that compelling the 
Council to include GLIB against its will was a clear violation of the 
First Amendment protection against compelled expression,6 the 
same doctrine that prevents a Jehovah's Witness from being forced 
to salute the flag? 
The parallels between Stropnicky and Hurley are obvious. 
Both involve applications of the Massachusetts public accommoda-
tion law. Both involve compelled association with a cause that is 
not supported by the speaker, the gay/lesbianlbisexual movement in 
Hurley and the plight of· men in divorce actions in Stropnicky. 
There are, of course, also differences. Stropnicky involves repre-
sentation by a lawyer. Lawyers, in certain circumstances, have been 
held to have fewer First Amendment rights than other citizens.8 
Further, in Hurley, the Court concluded that the St. Patrick's Day 
Parade was an example of communication protected by the First 
Amendment.9 An attorney repr·esenting a client in a divorce action 
is not as clearly engaging in First Amendment speech for several 
reasons. First, unlike the parade, the lawyer's expression, in the 
typical case, is not engaged in primarily as an act of political speech 
in order to inform the public. Second, the lawyer is expressing the 
views of her client and not necessarily her own views. While the 
lawyer is without doubt forced into an association with the client, 
First Amendment claims based on compelled association lO have not 
5. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
6. See id. at 58l. 
7. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Leora 
Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect 
Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REv. 817 (1986). 
8. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). 
9. See 515 U.S. at 568 (1995). 
10. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 
(1988) (upholding city's ban on discrimination in places of public accommodation as 
applied to private clubs with more than 400 members); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. 
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987) (upholding application of California antidis-
crimination law to prevent local Rotary clubs from excluding women from member-
ship); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984) (upholding 
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been as successful as compelled expression claims.ll 
This article will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Hur-
ley and compare it to the decision in Stropnicky. It will then con-
sider whether there are sufficient distinctions between the two cases 
so as to defeat the First Amendment argument that was successful 
in Hurley. It will conclude that the differences between the two 
cases are not sufficiently significant from the point of view of the 
First Amendment and that the application of the state public ac-
commodation statute to a lawyer's ideologically motivated decision 
not to represent a client violates the First Amendment. 
I. HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN'GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL 
GROUP OF BOSTON12 
Each March 17 a parade to celebrate both St.,Patrick's Day 
and Evacuation Day is held in South Boston. Until 1947, the City 
of Boston formally sponsored the parade. In that year, the City 
gave permission to the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council 
to conduct the parade. A parade permit has been issued to the Vet-
erans Council each year since 1947 .. 
In 1992, the Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group 
of Boston was formed to give gay, lesbian and bisexual persons of 
Irish ancestry a presence in the annual parade. The Council denied 
GLIB's request that it be permitted to participate in the parade, but 
GLIB obtained an order from a state court and the organization 
participated in the parade under court order. In 1993, the Council 
again refused GLIB permission to march and GLIB filed suit claim-
ing that the refusal violated the state and federal constitutions13 and 
application of state human rights law to prohibit the Jaycees from excluding women 
from membership). 
11. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking 
down requirement that campaign literature contain the name of the author of the publi-
cation); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1985) (in-
validating utilities commission order mandating that surplus space in utility billing 
envelope be made available to group disagreeing with the views of the utility); Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977) (enjoining enforcement of state requirement 
that all license plates display the state motto as applied to persons who objected to the 
motto on religious and political grounds); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (1943) (enjoining 
enforcement of mandatory flag salute requirement as applied to students and their par-
ents who objected to participating in the salute on religious grounds). 
12. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
13. The trial court dismissed GLIB's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims be-
cause it found there was no state action in the Council's refusal to permit GLIB to 
march. See id. at 563 n.l. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not overturn 
this finding. See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of 
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the state public accommodation law. The state courts found that 
the parade was a place of public accommodation within the mean-
ing of the state statute and that it lacked a "'specific expressive pur-
pose entitling the parade to protection under the First 
Amendment. "'14 
The Supreme Court reversed. It found that most parades were 
protected expression under the First Amendment and that the 
South Boston parade was no exception,15 The Council was not 
stripped of First Amendment protection either because the parade 
did not communicate a "succinctly articulable message"16 or be-
cause the organizers brought together various groups that partici-
pated in the parade and did not originate the content of the 
parade.17 
The Court found the state courts' application of the public ac-
commodation law violative of "the fundamental rule of protection 
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to 
choose the content of his own message."18 Speaker autonomy in-
cludes the right to decide what to say as well as the right to decide 
what not to say. The Court had no trouble concluding that the 
Council had "decided to exclude a message it did not like from the 
communication it chose to make .... "19 The Court found the point 
of view the Council had decided to exclude sufficiently identifiable 
to establish the Council's right to First Amendment protection.20 
Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Mass. 1994). The United States Supreme Court noted 
that the state action question was not raised in GLIB's cross-petition for certiorari or in 
GLIB's briefs. Moreover, GLIB specifically stated it was not pressing the state action 
issue when questioned at oral argument. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566. 
14. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563 (quoting from Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 
B25); see also id. at 564 (citing Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 636 N.E.2d at 1299). 
15. See id. at 569. The only exception identified by the Court was "[i]f there were 
no reason for a group of people to march from here to there except to reach a destina-
tion, they could make the trip without expressing any message beyond the fact of the 
march itself." Id. at 568. 
16. Id. at 569. 
17. See id. at 570 ("Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection 
require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communi-
cation. Cable operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech activities even 
when they only select programming originally produced by others."). 
18. Id. at 573. 
19. Id. at 574. The Court went on to state that it "is enough to invoke its right as 
a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining 
silent on another." Id. 
20. See id. at 575-76. The Court stated that 
[t]he message it disfavored is not difficult to identify. Although GLIB's point 
(like the Council's) is not wholly articulate, a contingent marching behind the 
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Moreover, the inclusion of GLIB would "alter the expressive con-
tent of their parade" because "every participating unit affects the 
message conveyed by the private organizers."21 
The Court rejected GLIB's argument that there was no threat 
to speaker autonomy because the Council would not be perceived 
as approving of the views expressed by each contingent of march-
ers. The Court found instead that "GLIB's participation would 
likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary 
determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message 
was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well. "22 
No sufficient asserted state interest justified a compromise of 
the principle of speaker autonomy. Massachusetts was of course 
entitled to guarantee gays, lesbians and bisexuals access to places of 
public accommodation in the traditional sense of, for example, 
preventing restaurant owners from refusing to serve a customer 
based on the sexual orientation of the customer.23 However, the 
state could not require speakers to modify the content of their cho-
sen message in order to express a message that met with state 
approval.24 
organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish 
are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers 
would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much 
claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as mem-
bers of parade units organized around other identifying characteristics. The 
parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, 
or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or 
have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the 
parade. But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not 
to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie 
beyond the government's power to control. 
Id. at 574-75. 
21. Id. at 572-73. 
22. Id. at 575. The Court analogized the Council to the publisher of a newspaper. 
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck down 
a requirement that a newspaper grant a right of reply to candidates for public office 
who had been the subject of negative comments in the paper. In Hurley, the Court 
reasoned that the parade organizers were as entitled to editorial control over the con-
tent of their parade as the newspaper was over the content of its pages. See 515 U.S. at 
575. 
23. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578 ("On its face, the object of the law is to ensure by 
statute for gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public accommodations what the 
old common law promised to any member of the public wanting a meal at the inn, that 
accepting the usual terms of service, they will not be turned away merely on the propri-
etor's personal preference."). 
24. See id. at 579 ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place 
of harnlful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than 
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II. THE STRENGTH OF THE HURLEy/STROPNICKY ANALOGY 
Hurley and Stropnicky have much in common. Both involve 
applications of the Massachusetts public accommodation statute. 
In Hurley, the Supreme Court characterized the application of the 
public accommodation law to the St. Patrick's Day Parade as "pe-
culiar."25 Under that interpretation of the law, the Council was or-
dered to permit GLIB to march as a unit in the parade thereby 
altering the expressive content of the parade. Similarly, the appli-
cation of the antidiscrimination statute to an attorney's decision 
whether or not to represent a client could be called peculiar. In 
Stropnicky, the Hearing Commissioner ordered Judith Nathanson 
to cease refusing to accept male clients because of their gender. 
The effect of forcing Ms. Nathanson to include men among her cli-
ents is to compel Ms. Nathanson to alter the expressive content of 
her legal arguments in order to represent the interests of male 
clients. 
The principal First Amendment claim in Hurley is a claim to 
speaker autonomy which includes the right to decide what not to 
say. According to the Court, "when dissemination of a view con-
trary to one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected 
with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy 
over the message is compromised."26 Similarly, Nathanson can rest 
her First Amendment claim on the right to decide what not to say, 
which she can argue includes the right not to advocate the interests 
of Mr. Stropnicky. In order to support this argument, Ms. Nathan-
son would need to establish the same five elements that the Court 
found to be decisive in Hurley. 
These five elements are: (1) that the claimant's speech is fully 
protected by the First Amendment; (2) that the claimant's refusal to 
speak is based on a dislike of the message she would be forced to 
communicate; (3) that the claimant would be forced to alter her 
own message by the addition of the compelled communication; (4) 
that the compelled message would be perceived as the claimant's 
own communication; and (5) that the government lacks a suffi-
ciently persuasive state interest to justify infringement of the claim-
ant's right to speaker autonomyP 
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened 
either purpose may strike the government."}. 
25. Id. at 572. 
26. Id. at 576. 
27. I am assuming for purposes of this article that Ms. Nathanson would need to 
satisfy all five of the Hurley elements. However, convincing arguments can be made 
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In Hurley, the Council was able to satisfy all five of these ele-
ments. First, the Court concluded that the parade was symbolic ex-
pression within the meaning of the First Amendment. According to 
the Court, "[n]ot many marches ... are beyond the realm of expres-
sive parades, and the South Boston celebration is not one of 
them."28 Second, the Court found that the Council rejected GLIB's 
request to participate in the parade because it disagreed with 
GLIB's message.29 Third, the Court concluded that the parade's 
message would be altered by the inclusion of GLIB.3D Further, the 
Court dismissed a contention that the participation of GLIB would 
not be perceived as signifying Council approval of GLIB's message 
because the Council merely served as "'a conduit' for the speech of 
participants in the parade 'rather than itself a speaker. "'31 The 
Court rejected that argument and concluded that the Council would 
be assumed to be in support of GLIB's message if GLIB were to 
participate in the parade.32 Finally, the Court concluded that com-
pelling the Council to modify its chosen message in order to express 
a state-approved message was not an adequate justification for the 
state's intrusion on speaker autonomy.33 
Ms. Nathanson's task in satisfying all five of these elements is 
not as easy as in Hurley. Ms. Nathanson first must demonstrate 
that her role as a lawyer involves expression fully protected by the 
First Amendment. Second, she would need to prove that her re-
fusal to represent Mr. Stropnicky is due to her disagreement with 
that the first and third elements should not need to be satisfied in the circumstances of 
this case. See infra note 34 (arguing that Ms. Nathanson's preference for silence over 
speech may make unnecessary any inquiry into the character of her lawyer speech); see 
also infra note 74 (arguing that the Court has not considered it relevant whether the 
compelled expression was likely to be attributed to the claimant). Of the Court's pre-
Hurley compelled expression cases, the methodology of Hurley is somewhat analogous 
to that employed in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), a case in 
which a shopping center owner unsuccessfully argued that he should not be forced to 
allow expressive activities to take place on his property over his objection. Among the 
Court's reasons for rejectiJ,lg the owner's First Amendment claim was the fact that 
"[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking 
signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner." [d. 
at 87. In addition, Justice Powell's concurring opinion noted that the shopping center 
owner did not allege that he disagreed with the ideas he was forced to allow to be 
disseminated on his property. See id. at 101 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the jUdgment). 
28. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
29. See id. at 574. 
30. See id. at 572-73. 
31. [d. at 575 (quoting from Brief for Respondent at 21). 
32. See id. 
33. See id. at 579. 
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the ideological stance she would be forced to assume in order to 
represent him. Third, in addition to disagreeing with Mr. 
Stropnicky, she would need to show that she would be forced to 
alter her chosen message by the requirement that she represent Mr. 
Stropnicky. Further, she would need to demonstrate that her 
speech on behalf of Mr. Stropnicky would be perceived as Nathan-
son's own speech thereby creating the impression that she approved 
of the message she was compelled to express. Finally, she would 
need to refute the state's argument that its interest in preventing 
discrimination in the provision of legal services was a compelling 
government purpose justifying the intrusion on the First Amend-
ment rights of attorneys. 
A. The First Amendment Status of a Lawyer's Speech on a 
Client's Behalf 
Unlike a parade, a lawyer's performance of her duties is not as 
obviously expression fully protected by the First Amendment.34 
One difference is that the speech of lawyers can be subject to some 
forms of regulation that would not be constitutional if applied to 
the expression of other speakers. 
34. Compelled expression cases can, with some difficulty, be divided into two cat-
egories. In one category, the compelled speaker would be silent, but for the govern-
ment's requirement that she speak. In the other, the compelled speaker has a message 
to communicate and the government requires a modification of that message. In 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Maynards were required to display the 
state motto on their automobile license plate. There is no indication in the case that the 
Maynards desired to use the license plate to display a message of their own. See id. at 
713 n.10. Their only action was an effort to cover up the state's message, not to substi-
tute one of their own. See id. at 708. Because they preferred silence over speech, the 
Court did not inquire into whether the Maynards' chosen form of expression was fully 
protected by the First Amendment. It only looked at their reasons for disagreeing with 
the motto. See id. at 713. By contrast, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
471 U.S. 626 (1985), an attorney had chosen to advertise his services. The state re-
quired he add to the information presented in his advertisements and therefore modify 
his chosen message. In this context, the Court considered it relevant that Zauderer's 
own speech was commercial and not political speech. See id. at 65l. 
An argument can be made that Nathanson is being forced to give up her silence by 
forced representation of male clients. If successful, such an argument might obviate the 
need to inquire into the nature of Nathanson's speech. On the other hand, if one looks 
at Ms. Nathanson's speech on behalf of existing clients as a message she is already 
communicating, the state is requiring that she modify her chosen message. Under this 
analysis, the character of her chosen speech would be relevant. Because of the ambigu-
ity that exists on the issue of how to characterize Ms. Nathanson's circumstances, I am 
assuming she would need to demonstrate that her speech is fully protected by the First 
Amendment in order to impose the same heavy burden of justification on the state as 
the Court did in Hurley. 
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In Gentile v. State Bar,35 the state bar disciplined an attorney 
for statements made at a press conference after the indictment of 
his client in a high profile criminal case. The Supreme Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the reprimand for violating a Ne-
vada Supreme Court Rule prohibiting the making of prejudicial 
extrajudicial statements about pending litigation. Although the 
Court struck down the Rule as void for vagueness,36 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist spoke for a majority of the Court when he stated that 
"the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be 
regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for 
regulation of the press .... "37 The less demanding standard was 
justified by the fact that lawyers, as officers of the court, "'have a 
fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will re-
dound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair 
administration of justice."'38 Extrajudicial statements by attorneys 
"are likely to be received as especially authoritative" and may un-
dermine the fundamental right to a fair trial by impartial jurors.39 
While the Gentile holding identifies some situations in which 
lawyers have fewer rights than other speakers, the holding does not 
apply to all speech by lawyers. First, Gentile implies a distinction 
between criminal and civil cases.40 Stropnicky arises in the civil 
context. Second, the holding is justified by special concerns that 
arise in the context of pending litigation.41 Stropnicky concerns the 
review of a separation agreement where the work of Nathanson will 
not involve courtroom appearances in front of a jury. Third, even 
in the context of a divorce action that must be resolved in a court-
room, in Massachusetts, as in most states, divorce actions are tried 
35. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
36. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in this aspect of the case in an opinion 
joined by Justices Marshall, B1ackmun and Stevens and concurred in by Justice 
O'Connor. 
37. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074. This part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was 
joined by Justices White, Scalia and Souter and concurred in by Justice O'Connor. The 
Chief Justice wrote a dissenting opinion on the issue of vagueness in which he disagreed 
with the majority's view that the Nevada Rule was unconstitutionally vague. 
38. [d. (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
39. [d. at 1074-75. 
40. See id. at 1074 ("Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key partici-
pants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the 
precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.") (emphasis 
added). 
41. See id. at 1072 n.5 ("We express no opinion on the constitutionality of a rule 
regUlating the statements of a lawyer who is not participating in the pending case about 
which the statements are made."). 
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by a judge and not a jury.42 Thus, juror impartiality cannot be 
compromised.43 
Even more significant than these distinctions, the First Amend-
ment right Ms. Nathanson seeks to exercise will have no effect on 
judicial integrity. She is not seeking to speak on behalf of Mr. 
Stropnicky in a way that could compromise the impartiality of the 
judicial process. She is seeking the right not to speak on his behalf. 
If her claim is upheld, a different attorney will represent Mr. 
Stropnicky and Ms. Nathanson will make no appearances on his 
behalf. When an attorney seeks to refuse representation of a client, 
certainly in a circumstance when other qualified counsel are avail-
able,44 no argument can be made that judicial integrity is 
threatened. Thus, the Gentile limitation on lawyer free speech· is 
inapplicable in the Stropnicky context. 
A second limitation on attorney speech occurs in the context of 
lawyer advertising, which is classified as commercial speech.45 As a 
less protected form of expression,46 commercial speech can some-
42. See SEAN M. DUNPHY, 21 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: PROBATE LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 3.6 (2d ed. 1997). 
43. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, c.J., dissenting) ("[The substantial 
likelihood of prejudice] test will rarely be met where the judge is the trier of fact, since 
trial judges often have access to inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are 
presumed to be able to discount or disregard it."). 
44. An argument can be made that the refusal to represent a client in a situation 
where no other competent attorney is available might impact on the integrity of the 
judicial process. Cf. FIC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423, 425-
28 (1990) (upholding application of antitrust laws to a group of lawyers who severely 
impacted the criminal justice system when they agreed to refuse new court appoint-
ments to represent indigent criminal defendants until they received an increase in com-
pensation and rejecting lawyers' First Amendment defense). No such situation arises in 
Stropnicky since Ms. Nathanson's name was included on a list of attorneys given to Mr. 
Stropnicky by the lawyer/mediator who drafted the settlement agreement. 
A similar claim was raised in Hurley. In order to gain access to the parade, GLIB 
claimed that the Council had a monopoly on access to spectators at the parade thereby 
enabling the Council to '''silence the voice of.competing speakers .... '" Hurley, 515 
U.S. at 579 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,656 (1994)). The 
Court found no merit in this claim since it concluded that GLIB was eligible to file an 
application to sponsor a parade of its own. While this response by the Court may seem 
somewhat unrealistic in the context of the St. Patrick's Day parade, the argument that 
Stropnicky will be able to find other well-qualified counsel is quite realistic. 
45. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that lawyer advertis-
ing that is not false or misleading is protected commercial speech within the scope of 
the First Amendment). 
46. Restrictions on commercial speech are analyzed under the three-part test of 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). The Central Hudson test subjects restrictions on commercial speech to interme-
diate and not strict scrutiny review. 
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times be regulated in ways that would not be appropriate if the 
speech at issue were fully protected.47 This principle also applies 
when the regulation does not involve a ban on commercial speech, 
but instead involves compelled commercial expression. An exam-
ple of this phenomenon is the case of Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel.48 Zauderer was a challenge to restrictions on 
attorney advertising by an attorney who had been disciplined for 
violating a number of those restrictions. Among the challenged re-
strictions was a requirement that attorneys who advertised that they 
took cases on a contingent fee basis disclose the fact that clients 
might be liable for substantial costs even if their lawsuits were not 
successful. While striking down other aspects of the law,49 the 
Court upheld this forced disclosure as justified by the value to con-
sumers of such speech,50 and the fact that the disclosure require-
ment was "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing 
deception of consumers."51 
While advertising by lawyers is commercial speech, the lawyer 
speech in Stropnicky involves much more than the advertising of 
legal services and therefore does not. implicate the commercial 
speech doctrine. Nathanson's speech goes beyond the advertise-
ment of legal services to the provision of those services. Ironically, 
while the cases in which state-imposed lawyer advertising restric-
tions have been upheld usually involve lawyers who aggressively 
pursue legal business iQ. unseemly ways,52 Nathanson is a lawyer 
who wants to turn down a client and is being prevented from doing 
so by the state. 
A more difficult issue in establishing free speech protection in 
Stropnicky is the issue of whether a lawyer's actions on behalf of 
her clients qualify as speech under the First Amendment; an issue 
47. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida 
Bar regulation prohibiting the sending of targeted direct-mail solicitations to accident 
victims for the 30 day period following the accident or disaster); Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,467 (1978) (permitting state to discipline attorneys for face-to-
face solicitation of prospective fee-paying clients). • 
48. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
49. The Court struck down a prohibition on advertisements that offer legal advice 
relating to a specific legal problem in order to solicit clients, see id. at 647, as well as a 
ban on the use of illustrations in lawyer advertising, see id. at 649. 
50. See id. at 651 ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information 
such speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing 
any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.") (citation omitted). 
51. Id. 
52. See supra note 47 for examples. 
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that does not arise in Hurley. In Hurley, the parade, while not con-
sisting of pure speech, qualified as symbolic speech under the First 
Amendment.53 The parade was purposefully designed as a commu-
nicative act performed before members of the public. Its First 
Amendment status was unclouded by any issue of ambiguous be-
havior that may sometimes be engaged in as an expressive act and 
other times be engaged in as an action with no communicative 
purpose.54 
Attorney speech does not fall as neatly into the category of 
protected expression. An attorney's work involves a variety of ac-
tivities, some protected by the First Amendment and others not. 
First, an attorney's work often uses traditional protected forms of 
communication: oral communication in conversations with clients, 
opposing counsel and in courtroom appearances, and written com-
munication in letters written and briefs and motions filed with the 
court. Other work is not "speech" within the meaning of the First 
Amendment. Examples include researching points of law, listening 
to the speech of others, and conceiving of an appropriate legal strat-
egy. Most lawyering involves some combination of speech and non-
speech elements.55 
53. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citing National Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 
43 (1977) (swastika); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
505-06 (1969) (black arm band); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
632-33 (1943) (flag salute); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (red flag». 
While under some circumstances symbolic speech receives less protection than pure 
speech, Hurley does not present such a case. Under the two-track analysis of United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), the government would need to satisfy 
strict scrutiny to justify regulating the parade because the government's motive for reg-
ulating the parade is a desire to alter the Council's expression due to its discriminatory 
content. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407, 412 (1989). 
54. By way of contrast to Hurley, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), the Court assumed, but did not decide, that overnight 
sleeping in connection with a demonstration to call attention to the problem of home-
lessness was protected by the First Amendment. In reflecting on sleep as symbolic con-
duct, the dissent commented: 
o It is true that we all go to sleep as part of our daily regimen and that, for the 
most part, sleep represents a physical necessity and not a vehicle for expres-
sion. But these characteristics need not prevent an activity that is normally 
devoid of expressive purpose from being used as a novel mode of 
communication. 
Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Pro-
tection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1984). 
55. While an argument can be made that the full protection of the First Amend-
ment is not available when speech and nonspeech elements combine, see O'Brien, 391 
U.S. at 376, this argument seems inapplicable to Nathanson's situation. First, Nathan-
son's performance of individual lawyering tasks is not symbolic conduct under the 
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According to the facts of Stropnicky, Nathanson, among other 
areas of practice, represents clients in divorce actions. Her work, 
therefore, involves the typical combination of speech and non-
speech elements ranging from reading documents in the privacy of 
her office to presenting arguments in the public forum of a court-
room. The particular task at issue in Stropnicky was the review of a 
separation agreement drafted by a mediator. That review involves 
a number of nonspeech acts such as reading the agreement, think-
ing about its provisions, and reviewing information gathered about 
the family and financial circumstances of her client in light of the 
provisions of the agreement. It would also involve elements of 
speech such as talking to her client about the agreement, writing an 
evaluation of the agreement, drafting alternative provisions to 
those in the agreement and negotiating with opposing counsel 
about contested provisions. 
While a sufficient amount of Nathanson's work involves oral or 
written speech to qualify as speech under the First Amendment, a 
second problem arises. Each individual item of speech may not be 
engaged in to promote a political cause or otherwise enrich public 
debate.56 The client in a divorce action seeks an end to her mar-
riage, a matter of great personal concern, but she does not seek to 
promote a political agenda. Using a distinction relevant in the pub-
lic employee57 and libel58 contexts, it is speech about a matter of 
private and not public concern. For that reason, it does not fall 
neatly into existing First Amendment categories. 
There are two responses to this apparent First Amendment dif-
ficulty. First, Nathanson's speech cannot be evaluated by looking 
O'Brien rationale. Second, the state's effort to regulate Nathanson's behavior is di-
rected at both the speech and nonspeech aspects of her law practice. The requirement 
that she represent male clients is not limited to the nonspeech elements of legal 
representation. 
56. Litigation is protected by the First Amendment when it is engaged in as a 
means of furthering political objectives. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 
(1963) ("In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving 
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treat-
ment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro commu-
nity in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find 
themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently tum to the 
courts."). 
57. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). For more recent applications 
of the Connick public concern/private concern distinction in the public employee con-
text see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378, 384-87 (1987). 
58. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985). 
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only at her speech on behalf of individual clients. It is necessary to 
focus on her law practice in its entirety as the speech she seeks to 
communicate. Through her choice of women clients and her efforts 
to vindicate their rights in marital disputes, Nathanson communi-
cates the message that she is a lawyer who seeks to advance the 
interests of women within the legal system. While this message is 
not necessarily communicated directly by Nathanson,59 her message 
need not be explicitly articulated in order to be protected by the 
First Amendment. 
A related issue arose in Hurley based on GLIB's claim, sup-
ported by the state courts, that the parade did not communicate a 
sufficiently articulate message. The Court rejected this argument 
by pointing to the clearly protected paintings of Jackson Pollock 
and the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll and concluding that 
speech need not communicate a succinct message in order to re-
ceive First Amendment protection.60 Even inarticulate speech is 
protected by the First Amendment. 
This arguable broadening of the First Amendment horizons to 
eliminate any need for the speech to communicate a specific 
message61 provides support in the Stropnicky case if Nathanson's 
speech is the message she communicates by her choice of clients 
and her advocacy on their behalf. However, if Nathanson's speech 
is not characterized by the nature of her law practice in its entirety, 
but instead by evaluating her speech on behalf of individual clients, 
the issue arises as to whether she can claim full First Amendment 
protection for this private concern speech.62 
59. Judith Nathanson engaged in one form of direct communication of her desire 
to represent only women in divorce proceedings. "[H]er advertisements for divorce 
clients were clearly and explicitly directed toward potential clients who were women." 
Respondent's Proposed Findings and Rulings at 3, Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 
M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). 
60. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
61. In an earlier symbolic speech case, see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 
(1974) (per curiam) (striking down conviction under state flag misuse statute), the 
Court had suggested that for symbolic speech to be protected it was necessary that it 
convey a "particularized message." Id. at 41l. 
62. The one exception to this private concern characterization would be in those 
instances where Nathanson's speech took place in a courtroom. All courtroom speech, 
because it informs the public about the judicial system, may qualify as public concern 
speech even though any single case may be pursued out of private motives. See Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) ("Plainly it would be diffi-
cult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the 
people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted .... "). Cases since 
Richmond Newspapers have expanded the First Amendment right of access to judicial 
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The issue of whether all private concern speech has a lesser 
First Amendment status has rarely been addressed directly by the 
Supreme Court. One significant comment by the Court occurred in 
Connick v. Myers ,63 a seminal case clarifying the rights of public 
employees to engage in expression without fear of losing their gov-
ernment jobs. In Connick, the Court made clear that only the 
"public concern"64 speech of public employees required a balancing 
"'between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees."'65 
Despite the critical character of the public concern/private con-
cern distinction in the context of the rights of government employ-
ees, the Court refused to declare this distinction to be generally 
applicable to the First Amendment: 
We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into 
one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which 
carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the state can 
prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdic-
tion. For example, an employee's false criticism of his employer 
on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his discharge 
but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action ac-
corded an identical statement made by a man on the street.66 
The Connick statement on this issue has not been qualified in any 
way since that case. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that pri-
vate concern speech that does not fall within any of the lesser pro-
tected categories of speech, such as commercial advertising, 
receives the full protection of the First Amendment. 
This analysis establishes that Ms. Nathanson's speech as an at-
proceedings recognized in that case to other aspects of the criminal process beyond the 
trial itself. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) 
(Press-Enterprise II) (preliminary hearing); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) 
(suppression hearing); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 
(1984) (voir dire). Thus far the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognizedap 
equivalent right of access to civil trials, although statements by the Court support that 
view. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 ("Whether the public has a right 
to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that 
historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."). 
63. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
64. Id. at 146. The Court defined public concern speech as speech "relating to 
any matter of political, social or other concern to the community .... " Id. 
65. Id. at 142 (quoting from Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968». 
66. Id. at 147 (citations omitted). 
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torney is fully protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, Ms. 
Nathanson can satisfy the first of the requirements to make out a 
successful First Amendment claim. 
B. A Lawyer's Refusal to Represent a Client Based on a Desire 
not to Advance the Client's Legal Interests 
The second element Ms. Nathanson would be required to sat-
isfy is that her reasons for refusing to represent Mr. Stropnicky fall 
within the ambit of the First Amendment. In its compelled expres-
sion cases, the Supreme Court has not engaged in a searching in-
quiry into the reason a compelled speaker objects to uttering a 
government-required message.67 Instead, the Court usually has ac-
cepted a speaker's assertion that he or she dislikes the compelled 
message.68 
In the MCAD hearing, Ms. Nathanson offered several different 
reasons for her refusal to represent Mr. Stropnicky. She "testified 
that she represented only women in divorce cases, in part, because 
she sought to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias in the 
court system."69 This explanation easily qualifies as a political mo-
tivation for her refusal to represent male clients. In her statement, 
Ms. Nathanson makes clear that the point of view she seeks to ad-
vance is the equal treatment of women in divorce cases. Represen-
tation of Mr. Stropnicky would not further Ms. Nathanson's 
political agenda.70 Indeed, arguably, by lending her support to a 
67. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), for 
example, the Court did not rely specifically on the challengers' religious objections to 
the mandatory flag salute, but instead more broadly spoke of "politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion" which could be a subject of disagreement between 
citizens and their government. Id. at 642. 
68. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995). One exception to the Court's willingness to accept a claim-
ant's assertion of disagreement with a state-imposed message is found in Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997). In Glickman, the inability to show 
that money raised through mandatory contributions by tree fruit growers was used to 
fund generic advertising with which the objecting growers disagreed was one reason for 
the defeat of a compelled expression claim. In its list of reasons for rejecting the claim, 
the Court stated, "since all of the respondents are engaged in the business of marketing 
California nectarines, plums, and peaches, it is fair to presume that they agree with the 
central message of the speech that is generated by the generic program." [d. at 2138. 
69. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MCAD Feb. 
25,1997). 
70. Mr. Stropnicky argues that his divorce raises issues that are "traditionally as-
sociated with women in divorce proceedings," id. at 40, because he is a "non-tradi-
tional" male who stayed home to care for his children while his wife worked outside the 
home, id. at 39. His argument is an effort to suggest that representation of Mr. 
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male divorce client and thereby switching sides, she would be 
forced to undermine the cause she seeks to promote. 
In addition to the elimination of gender bias, Ms. Nathanson 
also "testified that she needs to feel a personal commitment to her 
client's cause in order to function effectively as an advocate, and 
that in family law she has only experienced this sense of personal 
commitment in representing women."71 This description of her 
personal commitment to particular clients is also sufficient to qual-
ify as an ideological motive for her refusal. Ms. Nathanson's com-
fort level with advancing the interests of women and discomfort at 
promoting the interests of men is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment that she be forced to communicate a message with which she 
disagrees. 
C. The Alteration of a Lawyer's Chosen Message by Compelled 
Client Representation 
The third element that Ms. Nathanson would need to satisfy to 
make out a claim that her right to speaker autonomy had been vio-
lated is that she would be forced to alter the message she seeks to 
communicate by the requirement that she represent male clients. 
In Hurley, this element was satisfied by the Court's finding that the 
expressive message communicated by the parade would be altered 
by the inclusion of any single group in the parade.72 
In Stropnicky, Ms. Nathanson's chosen message, communi-
cated through her choice of clients and her representation of the 
interests of those clients, is that she is an attorney who exclusively 
advocates the interests of women in divorce actions. Ms. Nathan-
son testified that she believed female divorce clients took comfort 
in the fact that she only represented the interests of women. Her 
clients "feel comfortable sharing their anxieties and concerns with 
an advocate ... they trust to be wholeheartedly as well as intellectu-
ally committed to their interests."73 Ms. Nathanson's ability to 
present herself as an attorney who exclusively advocates the rights 
Stropnicky would be consistent with Ms. Nathanson's desire to eliminate gender bias. 
However, Ms. Nathanson is entitled to define her own beliefs. In Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court validated the Maynards' deeply felt religious and polit-
ical objection to the presence of the New Hampshire motto on their automobile license 
plate despite the fact that not all Jehovah's Witnesses shared the view that the motto 
violated their religion. See Brief for Appellees at 59 n.35, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977). 
71. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 40. 
72. See 515 U.S. at 572-73. 
73. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 40. 
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of women would be compromised if the state required that she also 
represent men. The mere fact of representation of men is enough 
to signify support for the rights of men in divorce actions and 
thereby compromise Ms. Nathanson's ability to communicate a wo-
men's rights message. 
Looked at this way, the parallel is sufficiently close between 
Hurley and Stropnicky. In Hurley, the Court reasoned that the 
Council would be forced to communicate a pro-GLIB message 
against its will if GLIB were allowed to participate in the parade. 
Similarly, Ms. Nathanson would be forced to communicate a pro-
male message if she were forced to represent Mr. Stropnicky 
against her will. This satisfies the third Hurley element. 
D. Perceived Speaker Agreement with the Message when a 
Lawyer Speaks on Behalf of a Client 
The fourth element that Ms. Nathanson would need to satisfy 
in establishing her First Amendment defense is that as. an attorney 
representing male clients, she would be perceived as approving of 
the claims she presented on their behalf.74 In considering this ele-
ment in Hurley, GLIB attempted to defeat the Council's First 
Amendment claim by arguing the Council only served as a conduit 
for the speech of others and was not itself a speaker with a message 
of its own to communicate. As a mere conduit, so the argUment 
went, there would be no public perception that the Council ap-
proved of GLIB's message. The Court ~ejected this argument by 
reasoning that organizers of the speech of others are just as entitled 
to First Amendment protection as direct speakers and that, as the 
parade organizer, the Council would be perceived of approving of 
every group it permitted to march in the paradeJ5 
In many ways, Stropnicky is the stronger case on the issue of 
Nathanson's First Amendment status as compared to the Council's 
status. According to the Court in Hurley, the right of speaker au-
tonomy is compromised "when dissemination of a view contrary to 
74. While the Court discussed this aspect of the case and appeared to find it sig· 
nificant, the Court acknowledged that it was not "deciding on the precise significance of 
the likelihood of misattribution .... " Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577. In other compelled 
expression cases, the Court has not considered the danger of misattribution of the 
speech to be critical to the success of the claim. In Maynard, there was little likelihood 
that the presence of the state motto on a vehicle's license plate would suggest that the 
driver of the car shared the view expressed in the motto. Nevertheless, only Justice 
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion found this fact to be significant. See Maynard, 430 U.S. 
at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
75. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
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one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the 
communication advanced."76 The Court found that intimate con-
nection even though the Council served as the organizer of the 
parade, but did not itself speak. As a sponsor of the speech of 
others, it still could claim First Amendment protection.77 Nathan-
son, by contrast, is herself the speaker. Moreover, unlike cases 
where the government compels a speaker to recite or display a 
state-composed message, Nathanson would be forced to use her in-
tellectual abilities to craft original speech to advance Stropnicky's 
interests. No prior compelled expression case has involved such an 
intimate connection between the speaker and the compelled com-
munication. In that sense, Stropnicky is the quintessential example 
of a loss of the "intellectual individualism" Justice Jackson spoke of 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,78 the first 
compelled expression case decided by the Court. 
Despite this intimate connection between the speaker and the 
speech, Stropnicky may claim that Nathanson only speaks as a law-
yer because she is hired by a client.79 In that sense, the client is the 
sponsor of the speech in much the way that the Council is the spon-
sor of the St. Patrick's Day Parade .. Because Nathanson is uttering 
her words as a conduit, a voice, for the positions of Stropnicky, it is 
possible for Stropnicky to claim that Nathanson is entitled to less 
First Amendment protection. This argument makes it necessary to 
consider the issue of whether the Court's response to the conduit 
argument in Hurley, that the Council, as the parade's sponsor, 
76. [d. at 576. 
77. The fact that the Council was not compelled to speak in the traditional sense 
may explain' why the Court has classified Hurley as a compelled association case as 
compared to a compelled expression case in at least one subsequent reference to the 
case. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 n.13 (1997). I 
have not analyzed Ms. Nathanson's situation as a compelled association case because 
compelled association claims have not been successful when used as a vehicle for chal-
lenging antidiscrimination statutes. See supra note 10 for examples. 
78. 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) ("We can have intellectual individualism and the 
rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional 
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes."). 
79. The fact that Nathanson receives compensation for her speech does not re-
duce its protected status. Much speech is engaged in to make money. Authors write 
books, movie producers distribute films, and' speakers give lectures all for financial re-
wards. The fact that the speaker is being paid does not deprive the speech of its pro-
tected character. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,150 (1959) (books); Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (motion pictures). The key factor is 
the content of the speech and not the motive of the speaker. See New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1965) (editorial advertisements). 
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would be perceived as approving of GLIB's message, applies to the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
This issue raises complex questions about the lawyer's role and 
societal perceptions of that role. One scenario paints the lawyer as 
a "hired gun," making arguments on behalf of her client, but not 
necessarily believing in those arguments. If this view is accepted, 
then no one would assume a lawyer personally believes any argu-
ments she presents on behalf of her client. This view is supported 
by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct which state that 
"[a] lawyer's representation of a client ... does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral 
views or activities."80 
Another view of the lawyer assumes a total identify of lawyer 
and client. Under this view, the lawyer is assumed to be a carbon 
copy of the client she represents, a form of guilt by association. 
Under this view of the lawyer's role, the lawyer is personally held 
responsible for her legal arguments and her choices of legal 
strategy. 
While the Hobson's choice between these two perceptions of 
the lawyer as either a "mouthpiece" or speaking on her own behalf 
is a complex question in general, the situation in Stropnicky does 
not require that a choice be made. In Stropnicky, this element is 
satisfied even if Nathanson is not perceived as agreeing with 
Stropnicky on issues of support and custody. Under the MCAD's 
interpretation of the public accommodation law, Judith Nathanson 
would be forced to represent a male client in a divorce action and 
protect that client's interests in the drafting of the settlement agree-
ment. Public perception, under any view of the lawyer's role, would 
at least suggest that Ms. Nathanson is willing to represent males in 
divorce actions and that she is willing to vigorously advocate for the 
rights of men in contests over the allocation of marital assets and 
custody of children. Since the public would perceive Ms. N athan-
son as a willing defender of the rights of men, her First Amendment 
claim satisfies the fourth element that she be perceived as agreeing 
with the speech she is forced to engage in on behalf of male clients. 
The only generally recognized technique for disavowing sup-
port for a position one appears to embrace is through the use of a 
disclaimer. This technique has been suggested as effective to disas-
sociate the government from a message it does not wish to appear 
80. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer ("MODEL RULES") Rule 1.2(b) 
(1996). 
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to endorse such as a religious display on public property,81 as well 
as for a shopping center owner who is forced to permit political 
activists to use the shopping center as the site for political activi-
ties.82 In Hurley, the Court also considered the utility of a dis-
claimer in the context of the parade. The Court rejected this 
option, concluding that there is no "customary practice" of the use 
of disclaimers by the sponsors of a parade and that "such disclaim-
ers would be quite curious in a moving parade."83 
This conclusion is even more necessary in the context of attor-
ney representation. First, disclaimers are only an option in cases of 
sponsorship of the speech of another, as would be the case if the 
Council were forced to include GLIB in its parade. Under the 
MCAD interpretation of the antidiscrimination statute, Ms. Na-
thanson would herself be forced to speak on behalf of Mr. 
Stropnicky, not just to sponsor his speech. Additionally, a dis-
claimer would be "quite curious" in the context of the representa-
tion of a client. No appropriate mechanism exists for an attorney to 
append a disclaimer to an argument made on behalf of a client. 
Moreover, even if there was such a mechanism, an attorney has an 
ethical obligation to zealously represent her clients.84 Disavowing 
agreement with a position presented on behalf of a client would 
violate that obligation. 
E. State Efforts to Eradicate Discrimination as a Compelling 
Government Interest 
The final element in Ms. Nathanson's case is the adequacy of 
the state justification for intrusion on her right to speaker auton-
omy. Once Ms. Nathanson establishes the first four elements of her 
claim, the burden shifts to the government to justify its intrusion on 
her First Amendment rights. In Hurley, the Court gave short shrift 
81. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment). 
82. See Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). 
83. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 576-77 (1995). While the Court in Hurley seemed to consider the availability 
of a disclaimer as an alternative means of protecting the Council's First Amendment 
rights, a disclaimer has not always been deemed adequate protection by the Court. The 
compelled expression claim was successful in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), despite the fact that TURN, the group authorized 
to include messages in PG&E's billing envelopes, was required to attach a disclaimer to 
its messages stating that the views expressed were not those of the utility. See id. at 15 
n.ll. 
84. "As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules 
of the adversary system." MODEL RULES Preamble para. 2. 
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to the state's asserted justification. It concluded that the applica-
tion of the public accommodation law to the parade was unlike 
traditional applications of that statute designed to prevent discrimi-
natory conduct such as refusals to serve customers in a restaurant 
on account of their race. Since the parade organizers were willing 
to allow members of GLIB to march under the banner of other 
parade participants, the Council's exclusion of GLIB was not based 
on the sexual orientation of GLIB's members.85 Instead, it was 
based on dislike of GLIB's message. According to the Court, the 
state ordered the inclusion of GLIB in order to assure the parade 
reflected a message that met with state approvaL86 The Court was 
dismissive of such a state objective since it was an objective that was 
contrary to the First Amendment.87 
In similar fashion, other state efforts to mandate state-favored 
messages such as patriotism have been invalidated by the Court.88 
By contrast, state attempts to outlaw discriminatory behavior have 
usually met with more favorable results even when pitted against 
claims of constitutional magnitude.89 The distinction between state 
efforts to outlaw discriminatory speech (forbidden)90 and efforts to 
eradicate discriminatory behavior (permitted)91 is not always easy 
to discern.92 This problem surfaces in Stropnicky. 
85. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
86. See id. at 578 ("When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it 
was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of 
their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with 
messages of their own. Butin the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object is 
merely to allow exactly what the ,general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids."). 
87. See id. at 579 ("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used 
to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, 
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit 
speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain 
antithesis. "). 
88. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
89. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (freedom of 
association); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (free exercise of 
religion). 
90. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
91. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-29. 
92. A rich literature has developed on the difficulties of drawing a line between 
protected speech and actionable conduct in the analogous context of Title VII sexual 
harassment cases. See Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.c. DAVIS L. 
REv. 815 (1996); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment 
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481,(1991); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't 
Bark, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 1; Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Envi-
ronment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1003 (1993); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sex-
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One solution to this dilemma in Stropnicky is that Ms. Nathan-
son has available to her a parallel argument to the one accepted by 
the Court in Hurley. She is not discriminating against Mr. 
Stropnicky solely on account of his gender. In her law practice, she 
willingly represents males in other legal matters.93 Her objection to 
representing Mr. Stropnicky is rooted in the legal arguments she 
would be forced to make on his behalf. Therefore, as in Hurley, the 
state's interest is not in preventing discrimination against males, but 
in forcing Ms. Nathanson to communicate views that meet with 
state approval. 
Another argument available to Ms. Nathanson is that no state 
interest, no matter how compelling, can justify compelled advocacy. 
In all of the compelled expression cases that have come before the 
Supreme Court in which the Court has recognized the existence of 
a substantial infringement on speaker autonomy rights, the Court 
has never suggested that forcing a speaker to communicate a 
message she disagrees with could ever be an acceptable means to 
even the most compelling of ends. In addition, while the Court has 
upheld antidiscrimination laws even when they intrude on constitu-
tional interests, none of these cases has involved an infringement on 
the right of speaker autonomy.94 Arguably, the Court is of the view 
that the use of compelled expression is an impermissible means to 
any end since it i~ a means that strikes at the foundations of the 
First Amendment.95 Under that view, just by establishing that the 
state is interfering with her right to speaker autonomy through its 
regulation of her client selection decisions, Ms. Nathanson has pre-
vented the state from defending its behavior by offering a compel-
ling justification. 
ual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 
461 (1995). 
93. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MCAD 
Feb. 25, 1997). 
94. See supra notes to, 89 for cases. 
95. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the 
Court phrased the question it confronted in these terms: "National unity as an end 
which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is 
whether under our Constitution compUlsion as here employed is a permissible means 
for its achievement." [d. at 640. The answer the Court gave was a resounding no: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an ex-
ception, they do not now occur to us. 
[d. at 642. 
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Under either of the two theories offered by Ms. Nathanson, the 
state will not be able to persuade a court that it has an adequate 
justification for its use of the constitutionally suspect means of forc-
ing Ms. Nathanson to communicate a message against her will. 
CONCLUSION 
First Amendment claims of speaker autonomy do not always 
meet with success. To assure success, a speaker must be able to 
demonstrate that her expression receives the full protection of the 
First Amendment, that her refusal to support the state's compelled 
message is politically motivated, that the state is forcing her to com-
municate a message to the public that she disagrees with, that the 
public would perceive that message as endorsed by the speaker, and 
that the state lacks a sufficient justification to intrude on the right to 
speaker autonomy. In Hurley, in striking down the application of 
the Massachusetts public accommodation law to the St. Patrick's 
DaylEvacuation Day Parade, the Supreme Court relied on the prin-
ciple of speaker autonomy to protect the South Boston Allied War 
Veterans Council from being compelled to include the Irish-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston as a marcher in 
the parade. 
Stropnicky v. Nathanson raises a similar issue of speaker au-
tonomy. Ms. Nathanson raises a claim of speaker autonomy to pre-
vent the application of the Massachusetts public accommodation 
law to her ideologically motivated decision to represent only wo-
men clients in divorce actions. As in Hurley, Ms. Nathanson's claim 
should succeed. First, she can demonstrate that her speech on be-
half of the clients she has chosen to represent receives the full pro-
tection of the First Amendment. Second, her objection to 
representing Mr. Stropnicky is based on her political decision to 
support the rights of women. Third, she would be forced to com-
municate to the public a willingness to represent men in divorce 
matters and to advocate their rights, a message that is contrary to 
her self-selected message as an exclusive advocate of the rights of 
women. Fourth, because of her compelled representation of men, 
the public would perceive the pro-male message she would be 
forced to communicate as one endorsed by Ms. Nathanson, a 
message she would not be able to disclaim. Finally, the state cannot 
justify its interest in forcing Ms. Nathanson to communicate a state-
favored message by its desire to eradicate discrimination in places 
of public accommodation. 
